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THE NARROWING OF FEDERAL POWER BY THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL CAPITAL
David Fontana*
ABSTRACT
This Essayprepared for a symposium hosted by the William & Mary Bill of
Rights Journal on the future of the District of Columbiaargues that American fed-
eral power can be better understood by considering the features of the metropolitan
area that houses the most important parts of the American federal government. In
other American metropolitan areas and in most capital metropolitan areas elsewhere
in the world, local life features multiple and diverse industries. Washington is the
metropolitan area that houses the most important parts of the American federal gov-
ernment, and Washington is dominated by the government and related industries.
Washington is, in other words, a political capital. The ambition of this Essay is to
make a descriptive point related to the status of Washington as a political capital.
Because of its location in a metropolitan area dominated by a single industry, federal
officials and those whom federal officials interact with are a narrower slice of the large
and diverse American republic. While the American Constitution might permit a range
of federal outcomes, the American political capital narrows that range of outcomes.
This narrowing has a number of implications. On the one hand, the American system
is less responsive to the range of interests existing in the United States. On the other
hand, the American political capital plays a particularly important role in limiting the
access by, and creation of, damaging private or governmental forces.
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INTRODUCTION
In the years before and during the creation of the American Republic, the location
of the federal government was a crucial and controversial issue. In The Federalist
Papers, there are many discussions of how the metropolitan area to house the federal
government should operate, led by James Madisons discussion in Federalist 43.1
The Constitution itself addresses the issue in Article I.2 In the first Congress of the
United Statesbetween 1789 and 1791one-third of the recorded votes in the first
Congress of the United States were about where key parts of the federal government
would be located.3
The location of the federal government evoked such passionate concerns because
the nature of the metropolitan area housing the federal government was thought to
play a significant role in shaping how that federal government would operate. Consti-
tutional design was important to the Founders, and urban (capital) design was seen
as a form of constitutional design. A generation concerned about the science of
politics4 was also convinced that the science of the capital would shape the nature
of federal power in the new American Republic.
1 See THEFEDERALIST NO. 43, at 27980 (James Madison) (Modern Library College ed.,
1960). I have written elsewhere about how the selection of one metropolitan area influences
features of constitutional law. See David Fontana, The Spatial Separation of Powers (2015)
(manuscript on file with author). This Essay is more limited to how specific features of that
metropolitan area influence constitutional law.
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (Congress shall have power to . . . exercise exclu-
sive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square)
as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States .).
3 SeeJOHN H.ALDRICH,WHYPARTIES?THEORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN AMERICA 68 (1995); see also KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASH-
INGTON, D.C.: THE IDEA AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 206 (1993) (describing
the location of the federal government as the first major crisis of the early Republic).
4 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at
593 (1969) (describing the American science of politics that would harness social forces
to create better institutional designs).
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Competing visions of the metropolitan area to house the federal capital emerged
among early political leaders. On one side were those who wanted the federal gov-
ernment located in a metropolitan area like London or Parisa metropolitan area that
was an urban Noahs Ark, with two of every social force.5 On the other side were those
who wanted a federal capital to be located in a less substantial and more focused
metropolitan area.6 Was the federal capital to be a diversified capital, or a capital
limited to those working in governmentin other words, a political capital?7 The
Compromise of 1790 meant that the latter perspective triumphed. Since metropolitan
areas have important path-dependent dynamics,8 the best way to ensure that federal
power was to be located away from other social forces was to create a new metropoli-
tan area, one specializing in government. In the years to come, the American Republic
might make the American capital city a new London or Paris, but for many years the
hope was that it would become a single industry town.9
5 At the time, the major debate was about keeping the government in Philadelphia, the
major American commercial center at the time. See BOWLING, supra note 3, at 1516.
6 Thomas Jefferson and his supporters in particular were skeptical of the more established,
more substantial, and more diversified metropolitan areas. See 10 THEWRITINGS OFTHOMAS
JEFFERSON 173 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1904) (I view great cities
as pestilential to the morals, the health and the liberties of man.). For a similar argument,
see ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 27879 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner
eds., 1969).
7 I will use the phrase government capital and political capital interchangeably
throughout this Essay simply to avoid repetition. I use these phrases to refer to a rather
simple notion: that those who work in or with the federal government dominate the American
capital. For earlier attempts conceptually to distinguish between capital citiesalthough with-
out discussing the implications of these differencessee Peter Hall, Seven Types of Capital
City, in PLANNING TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITAL CITIES 8 (David L. A. Gordon ed., 2006);
Scott Campbell, The Changing Role and Identity of Capital Cities in the Global Era (2000),
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sdcamp/AAG2000.html; Rajiv Rawat, Capital
City Relocation: Global-Local Perspectives in the Search for an Alternative Modernity (2005),
available at http://prayaga.org/documents/paper-capitalcity.pdf; Hal Wolman et al., Capital
Cities and Their National Governments: Washington, D.C. in Comparative Perspective
(George Washington Inst. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. 30, 2007), available at http://
www.gwu.edu/-gwipp/papers/wp030.pdf.
8 For discussions of this in the context of metropolitan areas, see Edward L. Glaeser,
Urban Colossus: Why Is New York Americas Largest City?, FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON.
POLY REV., at 7, 13, (Dec. 2005), http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/05v11n2/0512
glae.pdf; Edward L. Glaeser, Reinventing Boston: 16402003, at 13, 47 fig.1 (Harvard Inst.
of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2017, 2003). For a general discussion of this as a
social or political dynamic, see Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the
Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (The farther into the [larger]
process we are, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to another.).
9 In the late nineteenth century, as America started to assert itself on the world stage,
many hoped that Washington would become the Rome of the America in the arts, the Berlin
of America in education and the Paris of America as a city of beauty and pleasure. Carl
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The argument of this Essay is that the federal capital today is still a political
capital, and that this has an important influence on how the federal power being exer-
cised in that federal capital operates. A political capital narrows the federal power
that derives from that political capital. The federal government is not as capable of
producing as diverse a range of policy outputs as the American constitutional system
otherwise contemplates because of the metropolitan area10 in which most of those pol-
icy outputs are produced. The federal officials entrusted to create and enforce federal
lawfrom elected officials to other important federal officialswill be a narrower
slice of the American population because of the incentives generated by the political
capital to focus on a single industry. The peer influences on these federal officials will
likewise be narrower because of the narrower range of influences in a political capital.
The result is that whatever policy output is meant to come out of Washington will fit
into narrower boxes when it crosses metropolitan borders to leave Washington be-
cause Washington itself is a political capital.
This has important implications, and implications that are essentially flip slides of
the same descriptive coin. On the one hand, the narrowing of federal power makes
the federal government less responsive to the large republic that Madison wanted
represented in Washington.11 Many interests will struggle to have their policy perspec-
tives represented in Washington because their perspectives are not represented in the
types of people and networks that inhabit a metropolitan area dedicated to government.
On the other hand, this narrowing limits the access to, and creation of, problematic
private and governmental forces that undermine democratic governance.
An important caveat is in order before proceeding further. The ambition of this
Essay is to identify a series of system-wide and consequential dynamics that derive
from the siting of the American capital, and the normative implications of these
dynamics. While identifying the nature and implications of federal power in a politi-
cal capital, this Essay is not meant to take a normative position on whether this situ-
ation is normatively desirable or undesirable in the aggregate.
Abbott, International Cities in the Dual Systems Model: The Transformations of Los Angeles
and Washington, 18 URB. HIST. 41, 43 (1991).
10 I will use the phrase metropolitan area more often because social scientists have
found that this is the most accurate unit of analysis to describe modern life. Cities were the
older, denser, urban areas of the past. Metropolitan areasmeaning a broader range of area
stretching from downtown to suburb to exurbare the relevant units in todays urban life.
Indeed, the Census Bureau now uses the term metropolitan statistical areas to refer to
regions, and includes any locations within that region that is connected to other locations as
measured by commuting interactions. See About Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical
Areas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/metro/about (last visited
Mar. 11, 2015).
11 See THEFEDERALIST NO.10,at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) (The
two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation
of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly,
the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be
extended.).
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I. WHAT KIND OF METROPOLITAN AREA HOUSES THE
AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT?
A. Washington as Capital
The Washington metropolitan area houses and employs the large majority of the
most important officials of the American federal government. The Constitution implies
that there will be a single metropolitan area dominating the federal government.12 The
Residence Act of 1790 states that there will be a single federal capital metropolitan
area,13 and that the District of Columbia will be this permanent seat of the govern-
ment.14 Later statutes and regulations have solidified Washington as the headquar-
ters for most important federal offices.15 Given that federal law requires that the
headquarters of most important federal offices be located in Washington, the large
majority of major federal officials are working in Washington. For some specific parts
of the federal government, other statutes are even more specific, and identify Washing-
ton as the location of that part of the federal government,16 and some of these laws
require that those in office reside in the Washington metropolitan area as well.17
There are someif not manypowerful federal officials operating outside of
Washington. Members of Congress have offices in their home districts or states to deal
with constituency services.18 Executive agencieshaveregional enforcement offices.19
12 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (referencing a single District with ten miles square
as the Seat of the Government of the United States (emphasis added)); U.S. CONST. amend.
XXIII, § 1 (referencing the District constituting the seat of Government of the United States
and how its representation in Congress would compare to a State (emphasis added)). For
further discussions of the Constitutions treatment of this issue, see Phillips v. Payne, 92 U.S.
130, 134 (1875); Whit Cobb, Democracy in Search of Utopia: The History, Law, Politics of
Relocating the National Capital,99 DICK. L. REV. 527, 588 (1995).
13 See Act for Establishing the Temporary and Permanent Seat of the Government of the
United States, ch. 28, 1 stat. 130 (1790).
14 See id.
15 See L.ELAINEHALCHIN,GOVERNMENT AND FINANCE DIVISION,CONG.RESEARCH SERV.
RS21390,LOCATION OF FEDERALGOVERNMENTOFFICES (2004) (summarizing these statutes
and regulations).
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 127(a) (2006) (The Eastern District comprises the counties of . . .
Arlington, . . . Fairfax, Fauquier, . . . Loudoun . . . . Court for the Eastern District shall be held
at Alexandria [and other places].).
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2006) (While in active service, each circuit judge of the
Federal judicial circuit . . . and the chief judge of the Federal judicial circuit, whenever
appointed, shall reside within fifty miles of the District of Columbia.).
18 See MORRIS P.FIORINA,CONGRESS:KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
56 (1990).
19 See About OCR,U.S.DEPT.EDUC. (May 29, 2012), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices
/list/ocr/aboutocr.html (mentioning the regional enforcement offices that enforce substantial
civil rights laws like Title VI, the Age Discrimination Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990).
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Federal judges on the district and appellate courts operate outside of Washington,
although the Supreme Court operates in Washington,20 as does the hugely important
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
Some metropolitan areas besides Washington have concentrations of federal em-
ployees. Colorado Springs and Virginia Beach, for instance, have sixteen percent of
their workforce in federal employment, compared to just fourteen percent in Wash-
ington itself.21 However, the federal officials in these and other metropolitan areas
outside of Washington tend to be smaller in their policy importance. These officials
are farther down the organizational chart of the executive agencies they usually
represent. These officials tend to be focused on particular areas of the government.
For instance, Colorado Springs focuses on certain parts of the military.22
B. What Kind of Metropolitan Area Is Washington?
One means of classifying a metropolitan area is by its internal cultural and eco-
nomic homogeneity or heterogeneity. Most metropolitan areas are relatively narrow,
focusing on a singular industry and creating a metropolitan area that relates to that
industry. For instance, Detroit was focused on the automotive industry for some
time.23 By contrast, other metropolitan areas are more interally diversified. Consider
New York City, home to a finance industry that constitutes about one-third of the
local economy,24 but also a technology industry that is rapidly approaching that size
and rivals Silicon Valley.25 Washington is more Detroit than New York City.
20 The Residence Act sets Washington as the seat of government, and another federal
law states that the Supreme Court shall hold at the seat of government a term of court. 28
U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
21 See Richard Florida, Americas Federal Employment Belt, CITYLAB (Nov. 15, 2013),
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/11/americas-government-employment-belt/7576.
22 See id.
23 See Edward L. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities, in MAKING CITIES WORK: PROS-
PECTS AND POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009); John F. McDonald,
What Happened to and in Detroit, 51 URB. STUD. 3309 (2014). Because economic capital
is geographically mobile, this can cause problems for that metropolitan area when and if that
economic capital decides to flee. See Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Prac-
tice of Local Economic Development, 77 U.CHI. L. REV. 311, 327 (2010) (noting the problems
that mobile automobile-related capital caused for Detroit and therefore that Detroits long
history of dominating the automobile industry could have led to its current deteriorated state).
In this sense, a single-industry capital city is not as vulnerable, because governments are much
more costly to relocate than are private firms.
24 See James Orr & Giorgio Topa, Challenges Facing the New York Metropolitan Area
Economy, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issue/ci12-1.pdf.
25 See Jillian Eugenios, The Most Innovative Cities in America, CNN MONEY (Oct. 10,
2014) http://money.cnn.com/gallery/technology/2014/10/07/most-innovative-cities/index
.html?iid=HP_Highlights.
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Washington has always been a special case among American cities.26 At the
beginning, the United States was intended to have two centers, one economic, and the
other governmental.27 The Washington metropolitan area economywas from the begin-
ning dominated by the political industry. As Stanley Elkins and Eric McCitrick recall,
quoting a newspaper from the time, Washington in its first decade did not have a sin-
gle great mercantile house and had a total absence of all sights, sounds, or smells
of commerce.28
Washington still stands out among American metropolitan areas for the primacy
of federal government activity, and the primacy of that activity to the exclusion of other
activity.29 Forty percent of the Washington metropolitan economy is directly depen-
dent on federal spending.30 The federal government directly employs thirteen per-
cent of those in the labor force in the Washington metropolitan economy.31 The
other twenty-seven percent is otherwise reliant on federal government payments.32
This includes the rise of private firms receiving federal contracts from departments like
the Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security.33 Empirical stud-
ies of business networks find Washington far outside of the top metropolitan areas.34
These figures understate the centrality of the business of government to the
Washington economy. The presence of the substantial and stable federal government
transforms the incentives facing private firms. Private firms develop government-
related specialties that exist because of their co-location with the federal government
in Washington, and yet these private firm activities are not counted towards the mea-
sured economic output of the federal government in Washington.
26 Carl Abbott, Dimensions of Regional Change in Washington, D.C., 95 AM. HIST. L.
REV. 1367, 1370 (1990).
27 EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW YORK CITY TO
1898, at 306 (1998).
28 STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCCITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM, 17881800, at 181
(1993).
29 See Stephen F. Fuller, Market Conditionsand Dynamics in the Washington Metropolitan
Area: 19902003, http://cra.gmu.edu/pdfs/research_reports/other_research_reports/NVBIA
_report_2007/Market_Conditions_and_Dynamicsin_WMA.pdf (The Washington area econ-
omy is different than any other metropolitan area economy in the nation. Federal spending is
what differentiates it from the others.).
30 See Lokesh Dani, The Changing Labor Force and Sectoral Structure of the Washing-
ton D.C. Metropolitan Economy (Ctr. for Regional Analysis, Working Paper No. 2013-04)
available at http://cra.gmu.edu/pdfs/CRA2013-4LDani.pdf.
31 See id. at 2.
32 See id.
33 For excellent discussions of this trend, see Jon D. Michaels, All the Presidents Spies:
Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008);
Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland Security, 88 TEX.L.REV. 1435 (2010); Jon D. Michaels,
Privatizations Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010).
34 For examples, see Zachary R. Neal, The Causal Relationship Between Employment and
Business Networks in U.S. Cities, 33 J. URB.AFF. 167 (2011); Zachary R. Neal, Differentiating
Centrality and Power in the World City Network, 48 URB. STUD. 2733 (2011).
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For instance, metropolitan areas have their own, distinctive labor supplies.35 In
Washington, the labor that dominates that labor supply are those with human capital
related to the federal government. The number of important federal opportunities in
Washington creates an abundance of opportunities related to the federal government.
This lowers search costs and makes political employment opportunities easier to find.36
Job market depth also provides a form of risk pooling for those in the political
industry, insuring against firm-specific shocks.37 This depth also ensures higher
returns for those who specialize in this dominant government industry, because the
risk pooling created by market depth permits them to specialize in an area that best
suits their talents.38
Private firms located in Washington face incentives to specialize in government-
related work because of their comparative advantage in accessing government-related
social networks. Transaction costs are lower when people are more proximate to one
another,39 and so relationships are stronger40 and information flows more cheaply.41
Private firms located in Washington can lure former federal officials with the promise
35 For some representatives of the literature demonstrating this, see Sukkoo Kim, Expansion
of Marketsand theGeographicDistributionofEconomicActivities:TheTrends in U.S. Regional
Manufacturing Structure, 18601987, 110 Q.J.ECON. 881 (1995); Sukkoo Kim, Regions, Re-
sources, and Economic Geography: Sources of U.S. Regional Comparative Advantage,
18801987, 29 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1 (1999); Christopher H. Wheeler, Cities and
the Growth of Wages Among Young Workers: Evidence from the NLSY, 60 J. URB. ECON.
162 (2006).
36 See Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON.PERSP. 139, 14142 (1998); Paul
Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483, 484 (1991).
37 See Glaeser, supra note 36, at 146.
38 See JamesBaumgardner, TheDivisionofLabor,LocalMarkets,and WorkerOrganization,
96 J. POL.ECON. 509, 510 (1988) (providing evidence of increased specialization in deep labor
markets); Wheeler, supra note 35, at 65 (providing evidence of increased wages in deep labor
markets because of specialization).
39 For discussions of the continued importance of transport costs for human interaction, see
generallyGuyDumais et al., Geographic Concentration as a Dynamic Process, 84 REV.ECON.
& STAT. 193, 193 (2002); Edward L. Glaeser & Janet E. Kohlhase, Cities, Regions and the
Decline of Transport Costs, 83 PAPERS REGIONAL SCI. 197, 198 (2004); David Schleicher,
The City as a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 151720 (2010).
40 Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology,
24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 11 (1998) (Leaving a community tends to destroy established bonds,
thus depriving [the movers] of a major source of social capital.); Naomi Schoenbaum,
Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1069, 11931212 (2012); see also Luis M.A.
Bettencourt, The Origins of Scaling in Cities, 340 SCIENCE 1438, 1439 (2013) ([The]
average number of local interactions per person . . . is affected by their spatial distance.).
41 The classic account of this is by the British economist Alfred Marshall. See ALFRED
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 27172 (8th ed. 1953). For modern, empirical
evidence, see Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J.
MONETARY ECON. 3, 39 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Endogenous Technological Change, 98 J.
POL.ECON. S71, S75 (1990); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth, 94
J. POL. ECON. 1002, 1006 (1986).
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of the lower transaction costs these officials face in maintaining their connections to the
government. Others working for private firms and wishing to create these networks
with those in government can do so more easily in the capital metropolitan area.
This generates private firms that exist just in Washington. But it also means that
private firms that exist in other metropolitan areasand exist apart from political
lifetherefore have incentives to focus more on the federal government when branch
offices are located in Washington. A private firm in Washington is therefore never truly
a private firm. For instance, consider the operation of private law firms. Lawyers that
have served in the federal government can bring human capital generated by this public
service to the private practice of law, and add value to the services that their clients
are receiving. Law firms located in Washington can more easily recruit these lawyers
because of their more proximate location. Law firms located in Washington can more
easily facilitate these lawyers maintaining networks with those in the federal gov-
ernment. This is part of the reason why there is over seven billion dollars spent every
year in Washington on lobbying the federal government, much of it spent on law firm
lawyers lobbying.42 The networks that will assist these law firms with their other
effortssay, in the financial industrywill be more costly to operate from their more
distant Washington offices. These combine together to lead one study to rate Washing-
ton as the top metropolitan area in which to be a lawyer.43
Describing Washington as a political capital is an accurate reference beyond just
economic markets. The economic domination of the political industry shapes other
features of Washington in its image.44 Cultural regions are related to economic regions,
since professional interests are strongly related to personal interests.45 Scholars have
defined the United States as having several cultural regions,46 and because of its unique
metropolitan situation Washington has its own values, customs, and other cultural
information.47 Cultural regions are often defined by first effective settlement, mean-
ing that variations in the cultures of the peoples that dominated the first settlement and
secondarily by variations in the cultures of people that dominated later settlements.48
42 See Timothy M. LaPira & Herschel M. Thomas, Just How Many Newt Gingrichs Are
There on K Street? Estimating the True Size and Shape of Washingtons Revolving Door (manu-
script on file with author) (2014).
43 See Daniel J. Sernovitz, D.C. Tops Nation as Best Town for Law Firms, WASH. BUS. J.
(Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2012/10/dc-tops
-nation-as-best-town-for-law.html.
44 See Abbott, supra note 26, at 1370 ([C]ultural and economic models of regional pattern-
ing are complementary rather than exclusive, since both types of pattern are manifested by
shared behaviors that structure the perceptions and orientations of individuals.).
45 See Victoria C. Plaut et al., The Cultural Construction of Self and Well-Being: A Tale
of Two Cities, 38 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1644, 164753 (2012).
46 See RAYMOND D. GASTIL, CULTURAL REGIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 2633, 180,
190, 196 (1975); Bruce Bigelow, Roots and Regions: A Summary Definition of the Cultural
Geography of America, 79 J. GEOGRAPHY 218 (1980); Plaut, supra note 45.
47 Abbott, supra note 26, at 1370.
48 WILBUR ZELINSKY, THE CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES 77 (1973).
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Settled by and for its place as a political capitaland structured that way ever
sincethe Washington culture is a political one.
The metropolitan area that preoccupies itself with government during business
hours desires to hear about government after hours. One of the leading theatres in the
region, The Arena Stage, is staging a play about originalism.49 As Frank Rich of The
New York Timesa Washingtonian by upbringingput it years ago, Washingtons
idea of a Hollywood sex symbol is a cast member in The West Wingno matter
whombecause what could be more erotic than a powerful government bureaucrat?50
Because of its focus on government, the cultural critic Edward Wilson once said of
Washington culture that it had little personality of its own and [had] come to taste
rather flat.51
Washington differs from (most) capital cities in its singularity as a political capi-
tal.52 Many other capital cities are like London, Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Vienna,
Rome, Madrid, [and] Lisbon in their status as hubs of national politics, business and
culture.53 Consider, for instance, London, the capital of the United Kingdom. In
London, approximately seventeen percent of the work force is in the public sector.54
49 See Peter Marks, Coming to a Theater Near You:Scalia! The Play!, WASH.POST (Feb. 26,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/theater_dance/coming-to-a-theater
-near-you-scalia-the-play/2014/02/26/6f59c916-9e6a-11e3-878c-65222df220eb_story.html.
50 Frank Rich, The De Facto Capital, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at MGZ1. The rest of the
Rich essay is equally amusing, if equally disparaging of Washington:
The citys idea of an intellectual is a Sunday-morning talking head; its
literary apotheosis is the trade journal. Its loudest academic posturing
emanates from the so-called university without students, the think tank,
invented by the Brookings Institution in 1927 and a major Washington
growth industry since the 1970s. The think tanks tenured professors,
with grandiose titles that might have been lifted from the Marx Brothers
Duck Soup, are often out-of-office ideologues with more position
papers than books to their credit. Only in this heady environment could
William Bennett be mistaken for Harold Bloom and CNNs Capital
Gang for the Algonquin Round Table.
Id.
51 EDMUND WILSON, THE AMERICAN EARTHQUAKE 535 (1958).
52 The Turkish capital of Ankara and the Australian capital of Canberra are notable excep-
tions. The Canberra example is particularly apt. The Australian government was moved there
because there were no other existing institutions and were not likely to be any others. See K.
F. Fischer, Canberra: Myths and Models, 60 TOWN PLAN. REV. 155 (1989).
53 Id.
54 See London: Public Sector Employment 2012, OFFICE NATLSTATISTICS (Mar. 6, 2013),
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pse/public-sector-employment/regional-analysis-of-public-sector
-employment--2012/sty-london.html; The Percentage of People in Employment Who Work in
the Public Sector is at the Lowest Since Records Began, OFFICE NATL STATISTICS (Sept. 11,
2013),http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pse/public-sector-employment/q2-2013/sty-public-section
-employment.html.
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London is also a global center for finance,55 so nearly twenty percent more of the work
force is in finance than is in the public sector.56 If London were a nation-state, it would
have the seventeenth highest GDP, meaning that it is a hub for other industries as
wellartistic, tourism, and so on.57 While Washington loses many of its leading
cultural figures to more significant culture-producing metropolitan areas,58 London
imports not just elected members of Parliament but also leading actors and artists.
If anything, this understates the situation. Most other capital areas do not just have
other industries, but other powerful and substantial industries. The capitals are not just
political capitals but also cultural or educational or technological capitals. Combined
together, this means that most capital cities in the world are primate cities, meaning
that they are the primary location for so many industries that their importance dwarfs
other metropolitan areas.59 Nearly one-fourth of British economic activity transpires
in London.60 London is not just an artistic hub, but also the artistic hub of a country that
produces many cultural products.
II. HOW A POLITICAL CAPITAL NARROWS FEDERAL POWER
The consequence of the American metropolitan area housing most of those exer-
cising American federal power is to narrow the people in power and the networks
55 See SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO 147, 207, 235
(1992).
56 See Brian Smith & Gordon Douglass, Londons Economic Outlook: How is London
Performing?, GLAECON. (June 26, 2014), https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/In
%20house%20presentation%2026th%20June%202014.pdf.
57 See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST.,URBAN WORLD:CITIES AND THERISE OF THE CONSUMING
CLASS 19 (2012).
58 Think of figures like Duke Ellington, who left Washington in his 20s and was based in
New York City for the remainder of his career. See TERRY TEACHOUT, DUKE: A LIFE OF DUKE
ELLINGTON 105 (2013).
59 Scholars talkabout primate cities, meaning a metropolitanarea that is by leaps and bounds
the single dominate metropolitan area in the entire country. For the classic treatment, see Mark
Jefferson, The Law of the Primate City, 29 GEOGRAPHICALREV. 226 (1939). For more modern
treatments, see Alberto F. Ades & Edward L. Glaeser, Trade and Circuses: Explaining Urban
Giants, 110 Q. J.ECON. 195 (1995); Arnold S. Linsky, Some Generalizations Concerning Pri-
mate Cities, 55 ANNALS.ASSN.AM. GEOGRAPHERS 506(1995);Sebastian Galiani & Sukkoo
Kim, Political Centralization and Urban Primacy: Evidence from National and Provincial
Capitals in the Americas, in UNDERSTANDINGLONG-RUNECONOMICGROWTH:GEOGRAPHY,
INSTITUTIONS, AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 121 (Dora L. Costa & Naomi R. Lamoreaux
eds., 2011). Capital cities are usually the primate cites of their countries, while the United States
has no primate city. See Ades & Glaeser, supra, at 196 ([C]ountries such as Argentina, Japan,
and Mexico [have large amounts of] urban concentration when the United States largest city
contains only 6 percent of its population.); Galiani & Kim, supra, at 121 ([I]n almost every
country, the primate city [is] usually a capital city.); id. at 122 ([I]n the United States . . . [the]
national capital is not the largest city in the nation . . . .).
60 See id. at 2.
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of those people. While our Constitution might contemplate a range of different poten-
tial, constitutionallylegitimate policyoutputs from the federal government, the political
capital narrows which of those policy outputs are possible.
A. Federal Officials in a Political Capital
Our federal constitution leaves many decisions to the discretion of federal officials.
By one measure, the Constitution is one of the shortest in the world,61 and it uses gen-
eral language like commerce62 and executive power.63 Our system features defer-
ence rules that provide officials with room in applying and interpreting legal rules.64
The identity of those serving in officefrom the President to staffers in Congresswill
therefore play an important role in shaping how these constitutional rules are imple-
mented.65 Washingtons situation as an exclusively political metropolitan area selects
for a narrower range of officials than do other forms of capital metropolitan areas
bylowering the benefits for a broader range of officials to live and work in Washington,
and raising the costs on this broader range of officials.
People are more likely to stay closer to where they were raised, ceretis paribus.66
Longstanding Washingtonians will therefore exercise an outsized influence on the
supply of federal officials in Washington because they reap the benefits of working
for the federal government without having to endure relocation costs. The features of
the metropolitan area where someone is raised have a persistent influence on ones
behavior and preferences.67 This means that the distinctive experience of being a
Washingtonian enjoys a distinctive hold on those in the federal government.
61 See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Excep-
tionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 399 (2008) ([T]he U.S. Constitution is exceptional among
written constitutions . . . in . . . its brevity.).
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
63 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
64 This is featured in doctrines like the judicial presumption that Congress acted constitu-
tionally. See, e.g., Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) (Every possible presumption
is in favor of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a
rational doubt.); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871) (A decent respect for
a co-ordinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the
contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Congress . . . .).
65 See Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 VA.L.REV. 953, 953
(2005) (Constitutional rules . . . should focus not only on the creation of optimal incentives
for those who happen to occupy official posts at any given time, but also on the question of
which (potential) officials are selected to occupy those posts over time.).
66 See JaeHongKim, Residential and Job Mobility: Interregional Variationand Their Inter-
play in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 51 URB. STUD. 2863 (2014); Raven Molloy, Christopher L.
Smith & Abigail Wozniak, Declining Migration Within the U.S.: The Role of the Labor Market
(Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20065, 2014), available at http://www
.nber.org/papers/w20065.
67 For some examples from this voluminous literature, see David Knoke, Networks of
Political Action: Toward Theory Construction, 68 SOC. FORCES 1041 (1990).
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Metropolitan areas have their own distinctive attractions and repulsions that lead
some to move there and others not to do so. A major influence on what attracts people
to a metropolitan area is the amount of economic opportunities in that metropolitan
area, particularly for longer-distance moves.68 The growth of the Washington metro-
politan area in the past decades plus relates to the gap in job growth between the
Washington region and the rest of the United States.69
For the higher-skilled workers that occupy the most important positions in the fed-
eral government, relocation choices will be more influenced by what type of work is
available rather than how much of it. For a political capital like Washington, that means
the benefits of a relocation to Washington are greatest for those more interested in the
political opportunities uniquely presented by the political capital.70 Because Wash-
ington features so many important federal positions, there are many opportunities
for government work. Given the many policy domains that the federal government
regulates, there is a depth of opportunities across a lot of government-related domains.
Those interested in economic policy, health policy, and science policyalike will all find
thousands of rewarding employment opportunities in Washington.
With a depth of government opportunities, aspiring or actual federal officials can
specialize even more. A specialty is worth developing in a deeper labor market because
there are many different opportunities to utilize that specialty.71 This specialization
then encourages federal officials to focus on the policy areas they have comparative
advantages in learning.72 Deep labor markets therefore generate higher returns to work-
ers, in this case federal officials performing specialized policy tasks.73 Added to that
specialization is the greater power that the federal government exercises in our system
of federal supremacy.74 The benefits of relocation to Washington for those interested
68 See DAVIDK.IHRKEETAL.,U.S.CENSUS BUREAU,CURRENTPOPULATION REPORTS,GEO-
GRAPHIC MOBILITY:2008 TO2009,at 16 (2011), http://www.census.gov/prod /2011pubs/p20
-565.pdf; Yong Chen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Local Amenities and Life-Cycle Migration: Do
People Move for Jobs Or Fun?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 519, 519 (2008).
69 See Lisa A. Sturtevant & Maurice B. Champagne, Domestic Migration to and from the
Washington DC Metropolitan Area: 19852010 (George Mason Univ. Ctr. For Regl Analysis,
Working Paper No. 2012-01, 2012), available at http://cra.gmu.edu/pdfs/Domestic_Migration
_2012_01.pdf.
70 See Chen&Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 530 ([T]he willingness ofhouseholds to migrate
in search of jobs . . . is an important driver of local shifts in the supply of skilled labor.).
71 See, e.g., JamesBaumgardner, The DivisionofLabor, Local Markets,andWorkerOrgani-
zation, 96 J. POL. ECON. 509, 510 (1988) (providing empirical evidence of more specialization
in labor markets with greater depth).
72 See id. at 14546.
73 Cf. Edward L. Glaeser & David C. Maré, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 316, 317
(2001) (providing empirical evidence of a thirty-six percent wage premium in deeper labor
markets).
74 See U.S.CONST. art. VI (This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.).
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in government are substantialand those interested in government are not a particu-
larly diverse cross-section of the country.75
By contrast, other highly skilled and ambitious people with minimal interest in
government will find fewer benefits to relocating to Washington. The returns of relo-
cating to the diversified capital for those interested in working in government will
be substantial, as they are in the political capital. The difference is the return to those
interested in other industries in the political compared to the diversified capital.
Without the quantity of opportunities outside of government, the search costs
to locate these other opportunities are higher. Returns to employment in other industries
will be lower without the specialization afforded by deeper labor markets in those
industries. Those who wanted to reap the greatest rewards from a career in finance
move to New York because finance opportunities and compensation will be greater
there because of deeper labor markets for finance.
At the highest levels of the federal government, the political nature of the capital
shapes relocation decisions, but shapes them less. For instance, the returns of relocating
to Washington to serve as a member of Congress or as President are substantial.
While in office, intangible compensation is enormous.76 After serving in office, private
sector opportunities in a political capital will be substantial.77 If need be, the return on
the important position in Washington can be realized by relocating again to a metropol-
itan area with more than just political opportunities.
The result of all of this is an additional constraint on federal power because of the
identity of the federal officials exercising that federal power. Let us say, for instance,
that there are x number of possible understandings existing in the country regarding
how to use the Commerce Clause to regulate health care. One or more of those under-
standings will be shared by a collection of people who do not reside in Washington
and have no interest in relocating to a metropolitan area dominated by a single industry.
If these people are not represented in the Office of Legal Counsel or in the House of
75 See Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class
Versus the People?, in RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF AMERICAS POLARIZED POLITICS 55 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brandy eds.,
2006) (discussing how Washington selects for people who are active in politics [and] tend to
have more extreme views); John P. Heinz & Ann Southworth, Political Lawyers: The Structure
of a National Network, 36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 892, 896 (2010).
76 See Vermeule, supra note 65, at 96667 (Compensation can take many forms, of which
cash salary is only one. A given position may yield a stream of implicit compensation in the
form of inherent interest, the opportunity to promote the officeholders vision of good gov-
ernment, prestige, [and] power . . . . [I]t is unlikely that the pool of candidates for President
would be greatly affected . . . if the presidential salary were cut in half, . . . because the nominal
salary is dominated by the in-kind compensation, in the form of power and prestige, that the
office confers.).
77 It is worth noting that fifty percent of senators and forty-two percent of representatives
remain in Washington and become lobbyists after leaving office. See MARKLEIBOVICH,THIS
TOWN: TWO PARTIES AND A FUNERALPLUS PLENTY OF VALET PARKING!IN AMERICAS
GILDED CAPITAL 330 (2013).
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Representatives, the Commerce Clause understanding that would have resulted from
their inputs becomes less possible. Some federal powers will be pushed to their consti-
tutional limits because the population of officials that exists in Washington wants to
do so, and those who disagree are not represented in Washington. Other federal powers
meant to be used will fall into disuse. A pattern of those in the political capital initially
not wanting to use these powersand then fearing that reviving these powers will
flaunt existing precedent78will lead to these powers being underemphasized.
B. The Networks of Federal Officials in a Political Capital
Scholars in the social sciences have demonstrated the power of social networks on
individual behavior. As Cass Sunstein has written, [p]eople frequently think and do
what they think and do because of what they think relevant others think and do.79
Scholars have demonstrated in particular the power of social networks on political
actors like federal officials.80 It is still the case that our networks are dominated by
those living most closely to us, even with all of the technological improvements of the
past century.81 This means that the network of federal officials is dominated by others
living in Washington, and therefore by a narrower slice of the American population.
For personal networks, face-to-face interactions provide the most meaningful
form of interpersonal interaction.82 The connection and intimacy that is essential for
close personal relationships occurs more easily when sitting across the table from
one another than when sitting across the country.83 Personal social networks are
therefore more localized and place-specific. In the political capital, that means the
personal social networks of federal officials will be in the political capital, and will
disproportionately include others involved in the political industry.
78 See Gerry Mackie, Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account, 61
AM. SOC. REV. 999 (1996).
79 Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 77 (2000).
80 For some examples from this literature, see Matt Grossman & Casey Dominguez, Party
Coalitions and Interest Group Networks, 37 AM.POL.RES. 767 (2009); Gregory Koger, Seth
E. Masket & Hans Noel, Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks, 39 BRIT.
J. POL. SCI. 633 (2009); Seth Masket, It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization
and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 18492006, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 482 (2007).
81 See Glaeser & Kohlhase, supra note 39, at 20810.
82 See Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 43538 (2006); Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social
Ties at the Neighborhood Level: Two Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 URB. AFF. REV. 92, 96,
108 (1999); see also Schoenbaum, supra note 40, at 1196 (Many of our most basic needs
can only be met with in-person contact.).
83 SeeEDWARD L.GLAESER,CITIES,AGGLOMERATION,AND SPATIALEQUILIBRIUM 1 (2008)
([Some behaviors] are often highly localized; they usually thrive because of the speedy
exchange of new ideas along city streets.); Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the
Age of the Internet?, 47 URB.STUD. 2747, 2747 (2010) (The frequency of face-to-face contact
among socially close friends and relatives has hardly changed [since] the 1970s.).
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For personal networks in the political capital, other political industry veterans
are not just physically closer, but they are likely to have overlapping personal interests
and relationships. Personal networks tend to connect generally similar individuals,
often known as homophilybirds of a feather flocking together.84 This generates
overlapping relationships, so that personal networks are tighter not just because friends
share more in common, but because friends are shared among one anotherif I am a
friend with someone else, you are more likely to be so as well.85
Personal networks can cross industry lines, particularly because participants in
other industries can have previous personal connections or generate new ones
because of similar educational or recreational interests. The political capital raises
the costs of generating these personal connections across industry lines. The per-
sonal search costs of finding those outside of the political industry are higher be-
cause there are fewer people outside of the political industry. The motivation to endure
these greater costs is lower, because a deep bench of personal connections can be cre-
ated with colleagues or others not just with personal overlaps but also with shared
professional interests.
More intense professional relationships are also more easily created and main-
tained from closer together rather than far away. Scholars have demonstrated the power
of weak ties, meaning those relationships characterized by some but lesser emotional
connection and reciprocity.86 Weaker ties can be maintained more easily from
greater distances.87 Stronger professional ties require more frequent and more im-
mediate personal interaction, and thus are more difficult to create or maintain from
greater distances.88
Professional networks areconcentrated in thepolitical industryin the political capi-
tal not just because ofhomophily, but also because ofprofessional incentives. Network-
ing within the political industry generates larger professional returns. There are more
and more heavily rewarded opportunities in the political industry, and connections
open the doors to these opportunities. Many organizations in Washington exist
because of the desire of those in the political capital to generate these intra-industry
84 See generally Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Net-
works, 27 ANN. SOC. REV. 415, 416 (2001) ([C]ontact between similar people occurs at a
higher rate than among dissimilar people.).
85 See Damon Centola & Michael Macy, Complex Contagious and the Weakness of Long
Ties, 113 AM. J. SOC. 702, 704 (2007).
86 See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1361 (1973).
87 See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC.
THEORY 201, 20913 (1983); Barry Wellman, Physical Place and Cyberspace: The Rise of
Personalized Networking, 25 INTL J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 227, 234 (2001).
88 See Damon Centola, The Spread of Behavior in an Online Social Network Experiment,
329 SCIENCE 1194, 1197 (2010) (noting that human interactions of all sorts are shaped by
location, and virtual interactions are more often compliment than substitute); Meric S. Gertler,
Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of Context, or the Indefinable Tacitness of
Being (There), 3 J.ECON.GEOGRAPHY 75, 79 (2003) (identifying language, conventions, codes,
or communication, and trust as hard to transmit across distance).
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connections that open these intra-industryopportunities. Organizations like theCouncil
on Foreign Relations or the National Press Club deepen professional ties among those
in the political industry.
The returns to these professional networks in other industries in the political capital
are not as substantial. Networks outside of the political networks are more difficult
to generate because participants in these networks are more difficult to identify in
a metropolitan area dominated by the political industry. The professional returns to
these networks in non-political industries are more difficult to generate, and if realized
are more likely to be in another metropolitan area. Building professional networks
in private finance in the political capital, for instance, means more employment oppor-
tunities, but opportunities that are more likely to be in another metropolitan area with
all of the transaction costs that relocating generates.89
The narrower social networks generated by the political capital are still dispersed
into multipleat least twodifferent networks. Ideologically homogeneous political
factions organized around the two parties generate incentives for at least two different
political networks. Personal connections formed with those from another ideological
persuasion are less likely to generate meaningful dynamics of reciprocity and trust.90
Professional connections across partisan networks do not promise future professional
rewards to the same degree that intra-partisan connections do.91 Because social class
determines housing preferences as well, it is often the case that the political capital
generates inter-partisan networks because neighbors are from opposing parties. By
and large, though, this is an exception, and the narrower networks of the political cap-
ital mean there are two networks within the same industry rather than networks of
many industries.
The result of these narrower personal and professional networks for those exercis-
ing federal power is a narrower possible range of policy outputs. Networks perform
an epistemic role, providing people with new ideas and either legitimizing or dele-
gitimizing ideas that people previously held.92 Since Washington features more and
more prominent individuals tied to the government, that epistemic community shapes
preferences for those in federal power. Ideas about government that federal officials
might have had before or might be hearing from their constituents or friends and
89 For the evidence that individualsall things being equaldo not wish to relocate across
metropolitan areas, see, for instance, Portes, supra note 40, at 11 (Leaving a community tends
to destroy established bonds, thus depriving [the movers] of a major source of social capital.);
Schoenbaum, supra note 40, at 11931212.
90 See Shanto Iyengar et al., Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polari-
zation, 76 PUB. OPINION Q. 405 (2012); McPherson, supra note 84.
91 But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 865, 865 (2007) ([A] well-motivated executive can credibly signal [credibility by]
bipartisanship in appointments to the executive branch.).
92 See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97HARV.L.REV. 4, 42 (1983); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997);
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,
46 INTL ORG. 1 (1992).
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colleagues elsewhere will face the more and more frequent epistemic influences of
their local Washington community. Whatever these federal officials are hearing from
the agricultural community in Nebraska or the Canadian trade community in Upstate
New York is less likely to be represented in the daily, regularized epistemic commu-
nity of those involved in political life in the political capital.
Networks also perform a facilitative role, lowering transaction costs and there-
fore making transactions easier to achieve within a network rather than outside of
it.93 Because federal officials will have closer and more network connections to other
Washingtoniansand therefore disproportionately those in the political industrythis
means it is easier for them to engage in transactions with those in that industry as com-
pared to another industry. To bargain and complete a transaction with others, someone
must endure a greater cost. Either that industry must pay for permanent Washington
representation or arrange for a Washington meeting (with all of the transaction costs
that must be endured by bargaining with professional strangers rather than profes-
sional intimates94).
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NARROWING OF FEDERAL
POWER BY THE POLITICAL CAPITAL
Many constitutional rules narrow federal power. Indeed, one of the purposes of
a written constitution is to remove outcomes that politics might deliver from the realm
of the acceptable. This Part discusses the implications of the specific means by which
the political capital narrows power. The narrowing of the political capital poses prob-
lems for a vision of a responsive, democratic system, but at the same time constrains
and prevents the creation of problematic private and governmental forces.
A. Democratic Responsiveness
Our constitutional system was meant to create a government responsive to public
interest and opinion.95 Some scholars talk about this as a principal-agent relation-
ship, with the dynamic between agent politicians and their constituents as principals
riddled with agency problems.96 Nicholas Stephanopoulos has discussed this as the
alignment interest.97 Asingle-industrycapital metropolitan area increases these prob-
lems by narrowing the range of officials who work for the federal government and
93 See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 953 n.119 (2005) (summarizing the relevant literature).
94 See id.
95 HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 234 (1967).
96 Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 310 (2010). See generally
Robert J. Barro, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model, 14 PUB.CHOICE 19, 2226
(1973); John Ferejohn, Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control, 50 PUB. CHOICE 5,
59 (1986).
97 See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 283 (2014).
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narrowing the range of influences on those officials. This leads to many interests in
the country not having the capacity to find enough of their officials to serve in the
political capital or to have their perspectives represented in the capital.98 In other
words, the narrowing of federal power is not equally distributed. The political capital
has distributional effects on political power.
This notion that capital diversity is crucial to representing diverse democracies
was not lost on those creating other democraciesor on the Founders of the American
Republic. One of the arguments for capital cities like London or Paris is that a repre-
sentative democracy requires a representative capital metropolitan area.99 Some coun-
tries have relocated their capital to create a more representative capital. Nigeria moved
its capital from Lagos to Abuja so that there would be more Muslims who would be
closer to the central government and therefore more able to work for the central
government.100 Most American state capitals have been placed in locations meant to
equalize access for state populations.101 In the United States, Carl Abbott has written
of the ways that Washington was justified as the capital city for the first hundred years
of the country because it was a domestic border cit[y]102 and because it was not cap-
tured by particular economic or political interests like the existing metropolitan areas
of the North or the South.103
The problem for Washington, though, is that its single industry focus under-
mines any ambition for it to be a representative capital. Some interests in the country
will have no problem ensuring their people are in Washington even given its status
as a political capital. It could be that the benefits of political relationships that come
from time in the political capital are substantial to supporters of these interests. The
98 This critique ofWashington has sometimes originated on the political left, and sometimes
originated on the political right. In the more recent political past, conservatives have made this
claim. For instance, Ronald Reaganthen an actor and journalistdelivered a famous speech
in 1964 urging the election of Barry Goldwater as President in which he makes this genre of
argument. See Ronald Reagan, Address on Behalf of Senator Barry Goldwater (Oct. 27,
1964), http://www.reaganfoundation.org.pdf/ATimeForChoosing.pdf ([I]ts time we ask our-
selves if we still know the freedoms that were intended for us by the Founding Fathers . . . .
[W]hether we believe in our capacity for self-government or whether we abandon the American
Revolution and confess that a little intellectual elite in a far-distant capital can plan our lives
for us better than we can plan them ourselves.).
99 It was said of Berlin before World War II, for instance, that Berlin will require us to be-
come aware of arising social conflicts more directly than Bonn would because it was a metro-
politan area featuring a little of everything. See BERLIN-WASHINGTON, 18002000: CAPITAL
CITIES,CULTURALREPRESENTATION,ANDNATIONALIDENTITIES15 (Andreas Daum&Christof
Mauch eds., 2005).
100 See Omolade Adejuyigbe, The Case for a New Federal Capital in Nigeria, 8 J. MOD.
AFR. STUD. 301, 304 (1970).
101 See Erik J. Engstrom, Jesse R. Hammond & John T. Scott, Capitol Mobility: Madisonian
Representation and the Location and Relocation of Capitals in the United States, 107 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 225 (2013).
102 Abbott, supra note 26, at 1369.
103 See id. at 1370.
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informational insights about how federal regulators operate or the capacity to influence
these regulators could be particularly great. It could be that the direct and opportunity
costs of them leaving their existing lives are small enough that a temporary or perma-
nent relocation to the political capital is desirable.
Consider the financial elite from New York, for instance. There is a long tradition
of top officials from Goldman Sachs in New York temporarily serving in the federal
government (e.g. Robert Rubin, Henry M. Paulson, Jr.).104 The financial industry finds
it in its interests to secure a substantial degree of permanent Washington
representation.105 The lost time in the financial industry in New York City is not as
concerning because of the enormous returns to success in the financial industrygiven
the profits during a given year, missing a few years is not a substantial opportunity
cost.
For some other interests, though, representation and then government responsive-
ness to their interests will be more difficult to achieve. Some other interests will be
represented in Washington for reasons unrelated to their economic power. A po-
litical capital attracts and generates the politically engaged. Washington does not
lack those who follow politics and government closely, or who write about govern-
ment and politics, regardless of the resources of these politically engaged individuals
and organizations.
For other interests, though, Washington representation will be more costly to
achieve. For certain interests, engagement with political life either is or is seen as less
central to what those interests hope to achieve. The cultural and economic life of people
active in these groups does not match with what a political capital has to offer.
This suggests that these interests would not otherwise be represented in Washing-
ton, and must even go to the lengths of paying people to move there to work on their
behalf. Some of these interests can afford to do so, but some (perhaps most) cannot
afford to do so. These interests might not have the financial resources to generateWash-
ington representation if its stakeholders are not otherwise interested in Washington.
These interests might face particularly challenging hurdles. Certain industries are
located in geographically distant places from Washington and thus face great costs to
relocating their stakeholders to Washington.106 Most interests tend to have a strong re-
gional focusmost businesses, for instance, are regionally concentrated.107 If the
104 See Julie Creswell & Ben White, The Guys from Government Sachs, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2008, at BU1 (Goldmans presence . . . around the federal response to the financial cri-
sis is so ubiquitous that other bankers and competitors have given the star-studded firm a new
nickname: Government Sachs.).
105 The financial industry spent more than five billion dollars on lobbying between 1998
and 2012. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving
in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1363 (2013). It employs 3,000 lobbyists. See
ESSENTIAL INFORMATION & CONSUMER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, SOLD OUT: HOW WALL
STREET AND WASHINGTON BETRAYED AMERICA 10001 (2009).
106 See supra note 66.
107 See supra note 35.
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regional focus of these industries is someplace other than and far from Washington,
then the opportunity cost of foregoing that location and the experience and relation-
ships established in that location can be substantial.108
For these interests, another means of ensuring their influence in Washington is to
exercise even greater influence from outside of Washington. If they cannot send their
people to serve in elected or appointed office, or to be in Washington otherwise, at
least they can force elected officials to take notice at election time.109 Any outside
of Washington influence must be operationalized into a federal statute or federal
regulation, and this presents agency costs. A powerful interest in Nebraska with no
connection to the political capital will occasionally attract the interest of Washington.
But what happens when members of Congress or agencies sit down to write laws or
regulations quite different than what that Nebraska interest desired? In other words,
there is an agency cost facing even the powerful outside-of-Washington interest simply
because they are not in Washington.
Many of the same reasons why certain interests struggle to have a presence in
Washington will complicate their efforts to have a presence outside of Washington. If
a constituency is not interested in politics enough to relocate to Washington, it is not
likely to care about politics far from Washington. If it cannot afford to retain in-
fluence in Washington, it cannot afford to influence elections outside of Washing-
ton. This is not uniformly true, of course. The technology industry was for some
time very powerful in state and federal California politics before it achieved a real
Washington presence.110
Washingtons status as a political capital therefore serves as another vetogate
on change advocated by certain interests that have no representation in the political
capital. For those interests that are represented in Washington because theyhave reason
to invest in the political capital, the normal vetogates of the separation of powers must
be endured. For other interests not represented in Washington becauseof the limitations
they face in investing in the political capital, there is a political vetogate as well. With-
out their people in federal office or interacting with those in federal office, it will be
108 For this dynamic more generally, see Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social
Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985); Frank P. Romo
& Michael Schwartz, The Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The Migration
of Manufacturing Plants in New York State, 1960 to 1985, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 874, 879 (1995).
Federalism is often a solution to this problem. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, A Government
of Limited and Enumerated Powers: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 752, 762 (1995) (If minorities are concentrated geographically to some degree and if
the nation is willing to cede control over key issues to constitutionally established subunits of
the nation, then federalism can help maintain social peace.).
109 See Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM.POL.SCI.REV. 515, 51625
(2003). For an overview of this role for elections, see ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS
CRITICS (1989).
110 For a nice history and overview, see George Packer, Change the World: Silicon Valley
Transfers Its Slogansand Its Moneyto the Realm of Politics, NEW YORKER (May 27,
2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/05/27/change-the-world.
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harder for them to get their issues on the agenda or their perspectives on these issues
to be considered. The American system will not respond as much to them because they
are not located as much in Washington.
B. Stability and the Political Capital
Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers that a central challenge of constitutional
design was that [y]ou must first enable the government to control the governed . . . and
in the next place, oblige it to control itself.111 A political capital limits the respon-
siveness of the federal government to the full range of American interests. At the same
time, the political capitals inaccessibilityconstrains troublingprivateand governmental
forces. Some studies have suggested that political capitals contribute to democratic
stability by distancing the government from harmful private forces and creating addi-
tional transaction costs for them to operate, while at the same time constraining the
government by distancing it from other power centers in a country.112
1. Constraining Private Forces in the Political Capital
a. Existing Threats
First, the fact that a capital is a political capital means it is exposed to fewer fac-
tionsthat is why the federal government is less responsive. This mitigates the risk
facing a government by decreasing the chances that a problematic faction will emerge
that has access to the capital metropolitan area. The political capital therefore enjoys a
probabilistic relationship with threatening interests: the fewer the interests represented
in the capital, the less of a chance that there will be a threatening interest in the capital.
In some situations, the threat to the national government can emerge from sub-
national factions located elsewhere in the country. In comparative politics, one of the
variables that undermines democratization in emerging democracies is geographi-
cally concentrated, subnational interests that are opposed to democratization.113 If the
capital metropolitan area is a diversified area, that means all or almost all interests
will have easy access to powerincluding these problematic subnational interests.
Indeed, this concern was one of the reasons why Washington was made the capital
in the first place. Philadelphia was the nations capital during the Revolutionary War,
and there was a generalized concern that it would feature interests threatening to the
fledgling American government.114 In 1783, Revolutionary War soldiers who had not
111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 1, at 160.
112 See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 59.
113 See Edward L. Gibson, Boundary Control, Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic
Countries, 58 WORLD POL. 101 (2005).
114 See BOWLING, supra note 3, at 10 (quoting someone at the time being concerned about
the negative influences of commerce, local politics, luxury and mobs in Philadelphia);JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 120 (1833).
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been paid for military service wanted redress from the Revolutionary Congress. Their
violence directed towards the Congress forced it to relocate to New Jersey.115 In the
years following, there was concern related to Shays Rebellion and related to British
sympathizers that might have easy access to a Northeastern capital city.116 The deci-
sion to create a capital that was not and would not be part of any state was meant to
minimize the threat of unwise state political leaders capturing the federal government
for their own usages.117
b. Constraining New Threats
Another version of this concern is that more massive metropolitan areasthose
that are primate cities and not just political capitalsdo not just feature dangerous
interests but generate them more easily and make them more dangerous when gener-
ated. Modern social science has proven this, and even the founding generation knew
the threats posed to stable government by the greater capacity of urban areas to
generate mobs.118 Mobs are scaled goods, meaning they need lots of people involved
in them to be truly successful.119 Urban areas provide larger numbers of people and
115 See BOWLING, supra note 3, at 3034.
116 See ROBERTJ. TAYLOR, WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE REVOLUTION 14349, 154,
15657 (1954).
117 This was the reason for theDistrict Clause in theConstitutionprohibiting state control over
the federal government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (The Congress shall have power . . .
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding
ten Miles square) as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States.); see
also BOWLING, supra note 3, at 7677; Peter Raven-Hansen, Congressional Representation
for the District of Columbia: A Constitutional Analysis, 12 HARV. J. LEGIS. 167, 17071
(1975). Madison wrote that [w]ithout [exclusive jurisdiction at the capital] . . . a dependence
of the members of the general government on the State comprehending the seat of the gov-
ernment, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an
imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory
to other members of the Confederacy. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (James Madison)
(Modern Library College ed., 1960).
118 SeeBOWLING, supra note 3, at 1011 (Many Americans and their spokesmen in Congress
believed that cities, with their commerce, local politics, luxury and mobs, were by definition
anti-republican, and insisted that the United States should abandon the European precedent
of placing capitals in large cities.); KRISHAN KUMAR, UTOPIA AND ANTI-UTOPIA IN MODERN
TIMES 74 (1987) ([F]or Jefferson, . . . Americas pastoral utopia was the product of design,
enterprise, and toil. America was potentiallyacultivated garden, halfwaybetween thewilderness
of untouched nature and the refinements (too many) of commercial urban society.).
119 See Filipe Campante & Edward L. Glaeser, Yet Another Tale of Two Cities: Buenos Aires
and Chicago, (NBERWorkingPaper No. 15104, June 2009); FilipeR. Campante&Quoc-Anh
Do, A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to
Population and Capital Cities, (HKS Faculty Working Papers RWP09-005, 2009); Denise
DiPasquale & Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better
Citizens? (Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1815, Harvard-Institute
of Economic Research, June 2009).
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therefore a greater chance of attracting mob supporters. Urban areas are more densely
connected, and therefore lower the transaction costs for mobs to operate.
The political capital marginally reduces the risks of the threatening mob because
it is a smaller place and thus has fewer warm bodies to staff mob activity. The political
capital is not a city on the scale of a New York City or London. It cannot generate quite
the same number of bodies in the streets that those primate metropolitan areas can.
Other interests in the countrybut interests represented outside of the capitalhave
to be coordinated with for these riots to scale up even more. Coordinating with these
other interests in other metropolitan areas generates transaction costs.
The political capital also avoids suffering from all of the chaos and violence that
metropolitan areas endure. The United States has had its share of urban riots. During
World War I, Washington faced riots generated by different social movements.120 In
1968, Washingtons U Street burned.121 Washington has onlyfaced some of the notable
American riots. Other notable riotssuch as the Haymarket riots in Chicago or the
draft riots in New Yorkdid not influence Washington.
The political capital marginally reduces the risks of the threatening mob because
it increases the costs for an insurrection to gain attention. Destabilizing efforts rely on
mediaparticularly free mediafor their message to spread more widely. The po-
litical capital generates many symbols that can be used to generate media attention.
The March on Washington occurred on the Washington Mall, but left the Empire State
Building or the Golden Gate Bridge untouched. The political capital does not provide
all of the major symbols of the nation as a marketing tool in the way that a primate
city does.
Not only are the chances of chaos left in the political capital, but also the risks if it
happens are less. An insurrection only threatens the major institutions of the federal
public sector, but not the private sector. Contrast that with the diversified capital. It used
to be said of Germany after the Nazis controlled the government that whoever took
Berlin ruled Germany.122 In the capitals of Egypt and Tunisia, the capacity to control
Cairo and Tunis proved crucial because it meant revolutionaries controlled all of the
major institutions of national life.123
2. Constraining the Government in the Political Capital
In non-democratic countries, the existence of a political capital is often a conscious
tool of institutional control.124 Leaders wish to maintain control of large portions of
120 See CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CITIZEN 125 (2010).
121 See BLAIR A. RUBLE, WASHINGTONS U STREET: A BIOGRAPHY 2 (2012).
122 Gordon A. Craig, Berlin, The Haupstadt: Back Where It Belongs, 77 FOREIGN AFF.
161, 165 (1998).
123 See Ellis Goldberg, The Urban Roots of the Arab Spring (2014) (manuscript on file
with author).
124 See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 59.
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the government. Monitoring and therefore controlling of the government is achieved
more cheaply from up close rather than from afar because information travels more
easily when others are more proximate.125 This centralizes governmental power in
a particular metropolitan area.126
Private firms have similar reasons to co-locate with governments in autocratic
countries. Private firms located in the same metropolitan area as the government are
less threatening to autocrats than when they are located farther away because these
private firms can also be more cheaply monitored and controlled.127 Without much
private firm activity because of a massive, autocratic state, private firm co-location
does not overwhelm institutions of government.
In the United States, there are many metropolitan areas of enormous relevance
outside of the political capital. New York City is usually ranked as the single most
important metropolitan area in the world.128 The increasingly important technology
industry is focused on Silicon Valley in California.129 This distribution of relevant
and powerful institutions has no parallel in the Western world and creates a separa-
tion of powers as emphatic as anything in the Constitution.130 The federal govern-
ment in Washington faces greater costs in exercising its power because Washington
is a political capital. Information needed to regulate these industries is more costly
to obtain because it must be obtained from farther away.131 If the latest trends in private
equity are to be understood by the federal government to decide if it wants to regulate
them, they will need to send officials to New York City or Silicon Valley, or open
regional federal offices there. The federal government also faces greater costs in ob-
taining information aboutcompliance with regulations.132 The political capital therefore
serves as a vetogate on federal power. When the federal government wishes to regulate
private interests, it must expend greater efforts to do so.
CONCLUSION
Washington was always a different kind of place. In its early years of the American
Republic, while New York was a bustling port of over 30,000 residents, Washington
was a sleepy Southern town with mostly part-time residents who commuted from
125 See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 149
(2008); ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 27172 (8th ed. 1953); Schleicher,
supra note 39, at 152123.
126 See Ades & Glaeser, supra note 59.
127 See id.
128 See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., supra note 57.
129 For an excellent overview, see ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE
AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1996).
130 See BURROWS &WALLACE, supra note 27, at 306 (1996).
131 See supra note 39.
132 See id.
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other metropolitan areas to work in Washington when government was in session.133
Washington grew gradually as the federal government grew gradually, while New
York grew rapidlyas theAmerican economydid.134 Even now, as Washington becomes
more of a creative class capital like New York or San Francisco, its creative class is
dominated by those tied to the presidential administration of Barack Obama.135
The fact that Washington is a different kind of place has led it to be a commonly
used proper noun in the American political language. Washington is the word we use
to refer to the federal government, and Washington is the profanity we use to curse the
federal government when it is dysfunctional. The point of this Essay is that Washington
refers to something deeper than a political advertisement. Washington refers to a metro-
politan area dominated by government, and that domination narrows the outputs of
the American federal government. Life inside the Beltway constrains what policies
exit the Beltway.
133 See Abbott, supra note 26.
134 Compare id. at 1375 (A rapidly rotating population of soldiers and war contractors raised
the District of Columbia from 75,000 to 132,000 residents [between 1860 and 1870]), with
Glaeser, supra note 8, at 10 (Between 1790 and 1860, New York Citys population rose
from 33,131 to 813,669. The annual rate of increase rose from 1.8 percent to 4.7 percent.).
135 See Ashley Parker, All the Obama 20 Somethings, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2010, at MM46
(The young Obama crowd is polite and gracious, but they are uninterested in mingling with
the old guard. Theyve taken their social network from the campaign trail and transplanted it to
Washington.).
